Overview
This article discusses the current internal procedures at the University of Pittsburgh Regional Biocontainment Laboratory (Pitt RBL) for inactivation of samples containing biologically active BSL-3 agents, including those regulated as Select Agents, for removal to laboratories operating at lower biosafety levels.
Background
The Pitt RBL is a large, multi-user BSL-3 enhanced facility that is registered with the Division of Select Agents and Toxins for storage and use of Select Agents (Hartman et al., 2010) . The Pitt RBL contains approximately 27,000 square feet of BSL-3 containment space divided into three individual BSL-3 laboratory suites and four individual animal BSL-3 (ABSL-3) suites. Each suite contains standard analytical and safety equipment such as Class II biological safety cabinets, low-speed and high-speed centrifuges, microscopes, water baths, and incubators. Because of the facility design, separate pathogens may be used in each BSL-3 laboratory and ABSL-3 suite simultaneously. The Pitt RBL is currently approved to work with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and overlap Select Agents (Code of Federal Regulations, 2008a , 2008b , 2008c . Due to the size and complexity of the work conducted in this facility, the Pitt RBL has a dedicated RBL Management Team ("the Team") consisting of an Associate Director, Research Manager, Operations Manager, Biosafety Officer, Veterinary Supervisor, and Attending Veterinarian. The Team provides the necessary daily oversight for this large facility, including all work with Select Agents.
The Pitt RBL is the high-containment component of the Center for Vaccine Research. The Vaccine Research Laboratory (VRL) is the BSL-2, non-Select Agent component of the Center for Vaccine Research, comprising approximately 20,000 square feet. Although several key pieces of scientific instrumentation have been purchased specifically to support BSL-3 research and are located within the RBL BSL-3 containment space, including a FACSAria flow cytometer/cell sorter (BD Biosciences, San Jose, CA), a Bio-Plex suspension array system (Bio-Rad Laboratories, Hercules, CA), and a microtiter plate reader, the vast majority of instrumentation available in the Center is located in the VRL. Because duplication of all instrumentation at BSL-3 is cost-prohibitive, the Team determined that inactivation of infectious agents for safe removal of samples for further analysis in laboratories operating at lower biosafety levels and outside of a registered Select Agent use area was necessary. The objective of this paper is to describe the standard operating procedure (SOP) that the Team developed to meet this need, to provide details about the requirements for inactivation of BSL-3 materials at the Pitt RBL, and to provide a few examples of approved methods for sample inactivation used at the Pitt RBL.
The term inactivation, used here in the context of inactivation of samples containing BSL-3 bacteria or viruses, refers to a process which documents the absence of infectious or replication-competent particles using an approved protocol and allows analysis of inactivated samples at Biosafety Level 2. "Inactivation" should be viewed as very similar to "disinfection," meaning that infectious agents are rendered inactive or are eliminated, as opposed to "sterilization," meaning that all microorganisms present are rendered inactive (Favero & Arduino, 2006) . There are a variety of potential inactivation methods, some of which are chemical (i.e., formaldehyde or detergent treatment) or physiological (i.e., heat treatment or gamma-irradiation) (Blow et al., 2004; Hersberger et al., 2004; Mahanty et al., 1999) . Table 1 lists common inactivation methods. Incomplete inactivation of infectious samples, or the handling of infectious samples classified at BSL-3 without appropriate engineering controls, work practices, and protective equipment including respiratory protection, can lead to labacquired infections and potential outbreaks (Harding & Byers, 2006) . Incomplete inactivation of Select Agents can result in the possession of an active Select Agent for which the individual or laboratory is not registered, which could not only have potentially severe legal consequences, but could also result in mishandling of a Select Agent at an inappropriate biosafety level and therefore lead to an exposure or lab-acquired infection (Division of Select Agents and Toxins, 2011).
Standard Operating Procedure
The Team developed a SOP to describe the process by which investigators propose and gain approval for inactivation methods for removal of biological materials from the RBL BSL-3 facility. The SOP also describes a framework for safety testing, data submission to the Team, and approval. Finally, the SOP provides an example of a few standard inactivation methods that investigators can use. It is important to note that use of a standard method does not exempt the investigator from performing safety testing, providing data to the Team, and receiving approval prior to Verification of Inactivation Methods for Removal of Biological Materials from a Biosafety Level 3 Select Agent Facility use. The Team has taken a hands-on approach to oversee lab workers and ensure compliance. However, the Team has made it clear to investigators and their lab personnel that they (the investigators and lab personnel) are ultimately responsible for following the approved procedures and thoroughly inactivating BSL-3 samples prior to removal from the RBL.
Standard Operating Procedure for Obtaining Approval and Safety Testing of a Sample Inactivation Method 1. For all sample inactivation procedures, the investigator and his or her staff must notify the Team of the intent to inactivate biological materials for removal from the RBL BSL-3/registered Select Agent facility. 2. The proposed inactivation procedure must be discussed either at a strategy meeting prior to initiation of a project or at the investigator's standing monthly meeting with the Team. 3. Each proposed inactivation method must be described in detail, along with corresponding safety testing procedures that demonstrate the lack of viable infectious material after the inactivation procedure.
4. An investigator may use an original inactivation procedure, or he or she may use an existing inactivation procedure published elsewhere or developed by another investigator and listed in this SOP. 5. Once the Team has been notified of the inactivation procedure, the investigator may proceed with performing safety testing on the inactivated materials. Safety testing is required for both original inactivation procedures and for existing inactivation procedures developed by other investigators or published in the literature. 6. If an inactivation method is to be used for more than one pathogen, safety testing data must be provided for each pathogen or type of pathogen. 7. It is recommended to use a high-titer or concentrated stock of infectious agent in the safety testing to provide the most rigorous challenge to the inactivation procedure.
8. Upon receipt of the safety testing data and consideration and approval by the Team, the RBL biosafety officer shall provide written documentation in the form of a letter to the investigator listing the approved inactivation method(s) for his or her laboratory. 9. The investigator shall add the inactivation procedure to his or her biosafety manual, along with the applicable pathogen(s), and shall provide training to personnel on the approved inactivation procedure. 10. The investigator's personnel shall subsequently follow the described approved method(s) to ensure complete inactivation of all samples leaving the RBL. 11. If investigators wish to deviate from an approved inactivation method, or if they believe that an attribute of the infectious agent has significantly changed enough to justify repeated safety testing, then the modified inactivation procedure and additional safety-testing data must be reviewed and approved by the Team prior to use. 12. Inactivation procedure approval is reviewed quarterly with investigators, and as new inactivation methods are developed, investigators can receive additional approvals from the Team. 13. Investigators are encouraged to periodically repeat training of lab personnel on the inactivation method and/or safety testing to ensure procedural drift is not occurring. 14. There are safety standards for laboratories that operate at a lower biosafety level, such as biosafety level 2, and therefore personnel who remove inactivated materials to laboratories that operate at a lower biosafety level must still follow the safety standards for those areas. Such standards include face/eye protection, gloves, and lab gowns; use of safety equipment such as biological safety cabinets; and disinfection of all potentially infectious wastes and surfaces.
Focus: Investigator Responsibility per Inactivation Method
The Team requires that each investigator submit safety testing data for each distinct inactivation procedure, even if Gamma-irradiation 2 x 10 4 to 1 x 10 6 Rads Various Mahanty et al., 1999; Elliott et al., 1982 this procedure is considered to be a widely accepted standard method (i.e., phenol-based extraction of nucleic acids or formalin fixation of tissues). The Team believes that it is prudent practice for each investigator to verify empirically that no infectious agent is present upon completion of the inactivation procedure. Thus, if several investigators have approval to perform a specific inactivation procedure and a new investigator wants to perform the identical procedure, the new investigator still needs to provide safety testing data and obtain approval for the procedure from the Team. This provides the laboratorians with an opportunity to read each written procedure and to perform it. We have found this to be important as there tends to be "procedural drift" in laboratories, especially when the established precedents are verbal training and recall of procedures from memory rather than from documentation of procedures. By specifying each inactivation method in writing, we hope to minimize the potential for procedures to be followed inaccurately, which could potentially lead to incomplete inactivation of infectious materials, transport of infectious agents to an inappropriately lower biosafety level, transport of Select Agents out of a registered facility, and/or a laboratory exposure.
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Focus: Highest Achievable Count
It is recommended that investigators use the highest achievable count of infectious agent (i.e., a stock) in the safety testing procedure to provide the most rigorous challenge to the inactivation procedure. Although this level of infectious agent may be much higher than is reasonably anticipated in an actual experiment, it provides an important margin of safety. For example, should an infectious agent propagate in an experimentally infected animal to a much higher level than anticipated, the inactivation procedure will be robust enough to inactivate all of the infectious agent present. Additionally, some inactivating chemicals (i.e., phenol-chloroform or formalin) will cause death of eukaryotic cells used in viral plaque assays at lower (1:10 and 1:100) dilutions; therefore, it is important to have a high concentration of infectious agent at the start of the experiment to quantify the positive control beyond the first few serial dilutions.
Three Examples of Approved Inactivation Methods and Corresponding Safety Testing Data
Below are three sample inactivation methods along with a description of the corresponding safety tests that have been approved for use in the Pitt RBL.
1. Heat Treatment of Non-spore-forming Bacteria a. Inactivation procedure: Non-spore-forming bacteria shall be heat-treated by incubation at 65ºC for 3 hours in a water bath. After incubation, the liquid contents shall be transferred into a new clean tube, the outside of the tube shall be wiped or sprayed thoroughly with disinfectant, and then the sample shall be packaged for removal from the BSL-3 facility following SOP. b. Safety test: A suspension of the bacteria shall be prepared. As recommended in the SOP, the concentration of the suspension shall be of a sufficiently high level (i.e., a typical stock concentration such as 10 7 colony forming units (CFU) per ml). Prior to inactivation, 1 ml (10 7 CFU) of the bacteria shall be serially plated onto a suitable selective agar medium starting with undiluted material through a series of 10-fold dilutions to determine the pre-heattreatment count of the bacterial agent. At this starting concentration, there should be approximately 100 CFU on the "-5" or 1:100,000 dilution. After heat-treatment of the suspension as described, 1 ml of the heat-treated material shall be either plated onto a suitable selective agar medium or inoculated into a suitable selective broth medium to determine if the infectious agent has or has not survived the heat treatment. Plates or broth tubes shall be checked at 48 hours and again every 2 days through 8 days postincubation to verify that no colonies on agar plates or no turbidity in broth are observed in the heat-treated samples. The untreated bacterial preparation shall be used as a positive control, and it should yield colonies over a range of dilutions as described above for comparison with the heattreated preparation. c. Example of actual safety testing data: A suspension of Francisella tularensis was prepared to a concentration of approximately 1.0 x 10 9 CFU/ml using OD 600 measurement. The bacterial suspension was serially diluted (from undiluted to 10 -8 ) and plated onto Chamberlain's agar (CHA) to confirm a starting bacterial count of 1.34 x 10 9 CFU/ml. A portion of the bacterial suspension was heat inactivated at 65ºC for 3 hours in a water bath. Aliquots of 200 microliters of the heat-treated suspension were made in cryotubes and every twentieth aliquot was streaked onto CHA at an undiluted concentration to verify heat kill. A total of six aliquots were streaked. Plates were incubated and read at 48 hours and 9 days after inoculation. Based on the bacterial titer of the untreated starting material, the 200 microliters of streaked suspension should have represented about 2.68 x 10 8 CFU prior to heat treatment. No colonies were detected on any of the six plates of heat-treated bacteria at 48 hours or at 9 days after inoculation, thus verifying that heat-treatment inactivated the F. tularensis preparation. This was one of the first inactivation procedures to be approved at the Pitt RBL, and at that time, the Team did not require that the investigator also inoculate a suitable broth with the heat-treated material to verify lack of growth, as is currently required.
Phenol/Guanidine Thiocyanate Reagents for Inactivation of Pathogens for Nucleic Acid
Extraction (e.g., Trizol, TriPure, or TriReagent) a. Inactivation procedure: For liquid samples (serum, cell culture supernatant, homogenized tissue samples), 100 microliters of sample shall be added into 900 microliters of extraction reagent (1:10 ratio). The tubes shall be capped and vortexed thoroughly to expose the entire interior of the tube to the extraction reagent. Samples shall be allowed to sit for at least 5 minutes at room temperature with periodic mixing to ensure thorough inactivation. The liquid contents shall be transferred into a new clean tube, wiped or sprayed thoroughly with disinfectant, then packaged for removal from the BSL-3 facility. Nucleic acid extraction can then be performed in a laboratory operating at a lower biosafety level. b. Safety test: To ensure an appropriate margin of error, the concentration of the infectious agent in the test sample shall be of a sufficiently high level to represent a stock concentration (i.e., 1 x 10 6 plaque forming units (PFU) per ml). After the 5-minute incubation described above, 200 µl (20%) of the phenol/guanidine thiocyanate-preparation shall be serially diluted (1:10 through 1:10,000) and plated onto a susceptible cell line (for viruses) or appropriate agar (for bacteria). Bacterial samples can also be inoculated into a suitable selective broth medium to determine if the infectious agent has or has not survived the treatment. The aqueous phase shall also be extracted and tested by adding chloroform to the remaining phenol/guanidine thiocyanatepreparation as per standard nucleic acid extraction guidelines. The aqueous phase (200 µl) shall be serially diluted and plated using the same method as above. For viruses, death of the test cell line may be seen at both 1:10 and 1:100 dilutions of both the phenol/guanidine thiocyanatepreparation and the aqueous phase due to toxicity of the reagents. However, no viral cell death (cytopathic effect, or CPE) should be observed at higher dilutions for any of the samples. A positive control (untreated virus stock) should yield the expected viral CPE at dilutions higher than 1:100, and ideally the virus stock will be of a high enough concentration so that several dilutions higher than 1:100 should yield countable plaques. For bacteria, the untreated bacterial preparation shall be used as a positive control, and it should yield colonies over a range of dilutions for comparison with the treated preparation. If broth was inoculated, then growth/turbidity should be observed for the positive untreated control and no growth should be observed for the treated material. c. Example of actual safety testing data: See Tables 2  and 3 for examples of actual safety testing data for inactivation of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) and Francisella tularensis. Table 2 shows the safety testing data from Trizol treatment of liquid samples containing 2 x 10 7 PFU/ml of HPAIV following the inactivation procedure described above. 200 microliters of both Trizol-treated and aqueous phase samples were plated onto MDCK cells in serial dilutions (undiluted to 10 -6 ). Cell toxicity was seen at the undiluted, 1:10 and 1:100 dilutions as expected. No viral plaques were seen in the Trizol-treated or aqueous phase samples at higher dilutions, indicating inactivation of the virus sample. The positive control demonstrated countable plaques out to the 10 -6 dilution. As a second example, Table 3 shows the actual safety testing data obtained from TriPure inactivation of animal tissues containing F. tularensis. Tissue samples (liver, lung, spleen) were homogenized in media and treated with TriPure reagent as described in the procedure above. The TriPure-treated samples were serially diluted (undiluted to 10 -6 ) and plated onto CHA. Untreated portions of the same tissue samples were plated to verify bacterial count as a positive control. Untreated liver, lung, and spleen tissue had countable colonies out to 10 -2 to 10 -4 dilutions, with calculated bacterial burdens ranging from 690 to 8,500 CFU/g of tissue. No colonies were detected from any of the three TriPure-treated tissue samples.
Formaldehyde Fixation of Virus-infected
Eukaryotic Cells for Flow Cytometry a. Inactivation procedure: Virus-infected eukaryotic cell suspensions for use in flow cytometry should be fixed in 4% formaldehyde at 4ºC for 18-24 hours. After fixation, the fixed cells should be transferred to a new tube, vial, or plate, and then packaged for removal from the BSL-3 facility. Further analysis can then be performed in a laboratory operating at a lower biosafety level. b. Safety test: Even though 4% formaldehyde is used Table 2 Safety testing data obtained from treatment of highly pathogenic Avian Influenza virus with Trizol reagent. during the actual inactivation of the samples, this concentration is too high for safety testing because it fixes the test cell line and prevents determination of the presence of infectious virus using a plaque assay. A concentration of 0.4% and 0.04% formaldehyde can be used for a safety test because neither concentration fixes the test cell line, therefore allowing determination of the presence of infectious virus. To be conservative, the concentration of the infectious agent in the sample should be of a sufficiently high level to represent the highest anticipated level of the infectious agent in experimental materials (i.e., 1 x 10 6 PFU/ml). Virus-infected cell suspensions should be treated with 0.4% or 0.04% formaldehyde for at least 18 hours at 4ºC. Untreated samples should be used as a control for comparison. Untreated as well as formaldehyde-treated samples should be serially diluted (undiluted through 10 -5 ) and plated onto a susceptible cell line. Standard viral plaque assays should be performed to determine the number of infectious particles present in the sample. c. Example of actual safety testing data: Table 4 shows actual safety testing data obtained from inactivation of Rift Valley Fever Virus (RVFV) samples with formaldehyde. Samples containing 6 x 10 7 PFU/ml of RVFV were treated with 0.4% or 0.04% formaldehyde for 18 hours at 4ºC following the inactivation procedure described above. 200 microliters of each sample (approximately 1.2 x 10 7 PFU) were plated onto Vero E6 cells in serial dilutions (10 -1 to 10 -6 ). Cell toxicity was seen only at the 1:10 dilution for the 0.4% formaldehyde treatment. No viral plaques were seen in the samples inactivated with 0.4% formaldehyde; only two plaques were seen at the 1:10 dilution for the samples treated with 0.04% formaldehyde ( Table 4 ). Given that the standard protocol is to use 4% formaldehyde (10 to 100-fold higher than used in the safety test), the Team feels these data support that the samples are safe for removal to labs operating at lower biosafety levels.
Summary
The Pitt RBL Management Team has established an internal SOP for inactivation of biological agents for removal to a laboratory operating at a lower biosafety level. All investigators are required to provide a full description of any inactivation procedure, as well as detailed safetytesting data, for each pathogen. These must be reviewed and approved by the Team prior to routine use. Once the inactivation procedure is approved, the investigator must train his or her personnel to follow only the specified procedure. This allows RBL investigators to perform further analysis of their scientific materials in laboratories outside of the BSL-3 facility. The Team endorses that only inactivation procedures based upon sound science are in use, that each laboratorian follows the same written, approved procedure, that validation of the procedure has been performed and documented, and ultimately that BSL-3 agents including Select Agents are properly inactivated prior to removal from the registered facility. These all provide a level of confidence to both the Team and the RBL investigators that the samples being removed from the RBL BSL-3 facility are safe for use in laboratories operating at lower biosafety levels. While the SOP described here provides a necessary level of oversight, each individual investigator and trained laboratorian are ultimately responsible for following the approved inactivation procedure to prevent improper 
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